ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
One of the more popular devices for assessing the worth of a hydrocarbon exploration project in advance of the drill is the so-called decision tree. Basically one takes the best scientific information available for a project, and computes two major components; first, the probability that one will indeed find hydrocarbons (and equally, therefore, the probability one will have only a dry hole!); second, the cost of the project and also the likely gains to be made if indeed one does encounter hydrocarbons. It is well known that both the probability and the gains and costs are themselves very uncertain (see the many references in Lerche and MacKay, 1999) ahead of the drill providing ground truth information. In efforts to attempt to improve upon the uncertain situation, often a corporation will commit to collecting more data, usually seismic, in an effort to do two things; change the probability of encountering hydrocarbons from the value available without the added data, and second to reassess the size of the likely find so that a better perception of the putative oilfield is available. However, the new data are not obtained without cost. The question of interest is whether the extra cost of the added data brings a positive value to the project so that either the increase in potential worth (and the probability of encountering an oilfield) outstrips the cost of the new data collection and interpretation, or the probabilities of not finding an oilfield are sufficiently well resolved with the new data that one does not seek further involvement and so saves the cost of drilling. In other words, the value of the added data can be to enhance a project or to sharpen up knowledge sufficiently that a decision to be involved or not to be involved can be made more accurately.
The classic procedure for making such an estimate of value-added worth has been through the use of decision-tree methods. At its simplest level, a decision-tree, such as that depicted in Figure 1 , has two channels: a chance of success, labeled P, in Figure I , and a chance of failure, labeled pf. If no other channels are available then P, + Pr = I.
For the success channel one has potential gains G and a cost of exploration C, while for the failure channel one has the costs of the project C because the drill would fail to find hydrocarbons. The way one customarily assesses the worth of the project is to calculate the expected value (EV) of the two branches together as
(1) Figure I . Sketch of a two-channel decision-tree diagram for possible outcomes of an exploration project.
If EV is positive then it is usually assumed that, on average, the project is worth undertaking. The problem that arises is that an average value assignment fails to distinguish three major factors: first, there is not the possibility of doing an infinite number of trials, which is where an average comes from, instead one has just one chance to drill; second, the EV so calculated is not a possible outcome of the project, when one drills the outcome is either a gain at the value G-C or it is a loss at -C; third, even if one were to use the EV as a measure of worth of the project there is no categorization of the uncertainty of this worth. Thus, a project with P, =0.1 and gains of $250 million at a cost of $10 million would return an EV of $15 million; but a project with a success probability of 0.2, gains of only $150 million and a cost of $15 million would return precisely the same EV and, if this were to be the only criteria used, would be ranked as co-equal with the first project. Thus use of only the one statistic, EV, from a decisiontree has the unfortunate disadvantage that one has no idea of the risk of each project or, indeed, of the relative risk between projects with the same EV values. In tum, this disadvantage then carries through to the question of whether or not to spend more money to acquire new data to try to improve knowledge of the situation. It is often taken that it is sufficient to calculate the EV of the project in the absence of data collection and also to recalculate the EV under assumptions about how the new data will resolve uncertainties better as measured through the success and failure probabilities. Should the new EV be estimated higher than the old EV then it is often taken that acquisition of the data will improve matters and therefore the acquisition is worthwhile. Note that there are two assumptions: first that one knows, ahead of acquiring the data, precisely how the success probability will be altered by the data collection; second that it is an adequate procedure to use just the difference in the EV values to assess the worth of data collection relative to its cost. Neither of the assumptions is valid; indeed they can be so misleading as to cause major upheavals in exploration programs. And, even if the two assumptions were valid, there is still no capability of distinguishing between two projects that return the same EV values both before and also after data collection when one uses EV as the only statistic of relevance for a decision-tree.
It is clear that the problem stems from the fact that nowhere in classical decision-tree analysis is there any allowance for uncertainty of results; nor is there any measure used for the risk of particular projects, which may all have the same or similar EV values, but which can be widely different in success probability estimates, gains and/or costs. Indeed, this sort of information is critical to incorporate if one is to understand the relative worth of a project on its own or in relation to other available exploration projects. For example, even as recently as the present-day, McMahon et al. (1999) consider the effect of seismic acquisition and further studies expenses based solely on the difference between the EV of a project with and without the extra data collection. They advocate going ahead with the seismic data costs and collection based on that EV difference, and on assessments of what the differences would be in the probability of hydrocarbon finding. The purpose of this paper is to show that there are more useful statistical measures of worth than just the EV and that introduction of such measures permits a more accurate assessment to be obtained of the risk of projects with the same EV. Such measures also allow one to obtain a better representation of project success probability and also the worth of collecting new data at some cost. Such understandings are not possible based on the EV as the sole measure of worth.
II. REPRESENTATIONS OF RISK AND UNCERTAINTY
In addition to the EV of a project as defined above, there are three other measures that help to characterize the risk and chances of success.
A. Variance and Standard Error Bearing in mind that the EV is not one of the two outcomes possible with the decisiontree of Figure I , the most relevant quantity to obtain is the uncertainty on EV. For the two-branch decision-tree above, the uncertainty is defined in terms of the standard error of EV. As is well known (Lerche and MacKay, 1999) , the second moment, E 2 , of the two-branch system is given by (I) so that the variance, 0 2, is then given in general by The use of the standard error tells one how uncertain the EV is; a small value of 0 relative to EV means that the expected value is well determined; a large value of a relative to EV means that there is considerable uncertainty on EV. Thus the inclusion of a in the process of risking projects enables one to identify which projects are riskier than others even if they have identical EV values. For instance, in the example given above where one had two projects with the same EV of $15million, one has a = $64million for the project with potential gains of $150million, whereas one has a = $75million for the project with potential gains of $250million. While both have the same EV, the first project is less risky in terms of uncertainty on EV than the lower probability of success but higher potential gains project. Hence the use of standard error provides a quantitative measure lifting the degeneracy that would otherwise exist on projects with the same EV and also providing a measure of the accuracy of EV as a parameter capable of quantifying a project's worth.
B. Volatility As a device for assessing the quality of the risk of a project a combination of standard error and EV is often used, named the volatility,v, and defined by v =a/lEVI 627 (4)
The volatility provides a measure of the accuracy of the EV value. A volatility much less than unity (v«1) indicates that there is but little uncertainty in EV and so it can be used as an accurate representation of the worth of a project. However, a volatility much larger than unity (v» 1) indicates that there is considerable uncertainty and so the use of EV as a representative measure of the worth of a project is severely compromised. Basically what is happening in the case of high volatility is that the EV value is so far removed from either the success branch worth or the failure branch worth that there is really very little relevance to EV as a characteristic yardstick of a project's value. For instance in the two cases above, the first project has a volatility of 4 while the second has a volatility of 5, so that both projects are fairly high risk relative to using EV as the project worth measure, and the second project is 25% riskier than the first (volatility ratio of 5/4), relative to using volatility as the measure of risk.
C. Probability of Profit
Based on only the EV and the standard error information, a, for a project, one can write the equivalent Gaussian probability, P (W), that the project should return a worth greater than or equal to a specified value, W, as (6) where B = (W -EV)/(2 Il2a ). If one asks for the probability of making a profit of EV or greater then W=EV (and so B=O) so that P (EV)=50%, as it should. One of the conventional uses of this cumulative probability measure of worth is to ask for the probability of making any profit at all, i.e. W=O, corresponding to B= -1/(2 Jl2v). Thus there is a relatively tight intertwining of EV, standard error a, volatility v, and probability of profit. Each of the three measures uses different combinations of EV and standard error in order to provide different perspectives on the worth of going ahead with involvement in a project and of assessing the risk of the project. In particular, it is clear that such measures provide a much sharper picture of what is occurring with a project than does the EV alone, which can be extremely ambiguous, does not include the riskiness of the project, and often does not bear much resemblance to the possible outcomes of a projecta major deficit which is compensated for using the other three measures.
III. APPLICATION TO THE QUESTION OF VALUE-ADDED SEISMIC DATA
The application of the above measures of risk is of considerable use when evaluating the worth of acquiring more seismic data, or of doing further studies, in order to refine the estimate of the worth of a project. This sort of concern is generally referred to as the value of added information. In particular, in this section we work through an application of these risk procedures using Figure 2 , modified from McMahon et al. (1999) . Consider then the upper decision-tree of Figure 2 , labeled A. As noted on the figure, EVA=$15million. Using the procedure of Section II of this paper it is then a simple matter to show that o A =$71.4million, so that the volatility of the upper section of the decision-tree is vA =4.76, considerably in excess of unity. Thus EVA is extremely poorly determined and, indeed, the corresponding probability of making any profit is only P (0) A = 58.4%, making the project one of high risk and not very likely to be worthwhile.
Consider then the lower decision-tree of Figure 2 , labeled B. Here one can spend an amount of $3million for a 3D seismic survey and also an extra amount of $1 million for further studies in an attempt to improve the resolution of the project. If one does so then, as given by McMahon et al. (1999) , the probability parameters of the project are changed as shown on part B of Figure 2 . The question is whether such an expenditure of money is worthwhile. A total of $4million more is being spent than would have been the case if one had just used the upper A part of the decision-tree to decide on corporate involvement in the project. While the lower B part of the decision-tree diagram is considerably more complex than the upper A part, the statistical measures to extract are just EVBand oB . Now EV Bhas already been calculated by McMahon et al. ( 1999) and is EVA = $18.6mill ion. McMahon et al. (1999) comment that "By calculating the estimated risked value (EV) of the prospect with and without a 3-D survey the exploration team can establish the "value" of acquiring the survey. When this "value" is positive the team should strongly consider acquiring the survey. If the value is small or negative, then the exploration team should revisit the survey proposal to establish if it still makes business sense". Regrettably no definition is given of "small" nor, indeed, is it clear that a negative value should be discounted; for instance a positive value of $1 or a negative value of -$1 are both extremely small compared to the level of positive and negative values for each channel so one would hardly be justified in considering either to be relevant. The point here is that there has to be some way of quantifying the value added. The difference in the EV values for the A and B branches of the Figure 2 decision-tree is not an accurate measure of the value added without including the attendant uncertainty. Unfortunately the EV in either the A or B branches of the decision-tree is not an accurate measure of the prospect worth because each has a large uncertainty as measured by its standard error. In the case of the B branch it can readily be shown using Figure 2 that 0B = $66.02million, so that there is still considerable uncertainty on EV because the volatility is now VB = 3.55. While reduced compared to the value of 4.76 relevant for the A branch, the volatility is still large compared to unity and so the project is still extremely risky. The relative improvement in risk, as measured by the ratio of volatilities (3.55/4.76), is some 25%, so that it is true that the project uncertainty has been reduced by the acquisition of the survey and the cost of the further studies. However, the improvement has not converted the project into one in which there is a high chance of it being profitable. Indeed the cumulative probability of turning any profit at all for the B branch is P (0) B = 61.2% -only a 2.8% change in the probability of profit estimate from the A branch obtained in the absence of spending $4million on the 3-D seismic survey and the further studies. And the chance of being profitable is still not very far above the 50:50 break-even probability value of EV or greater. In the A branch one has only an extra 8.4% chance of making any profit at all, and the B branch only improves matter to an extra 11.2% above the 50:50 chance of getting a return at EV or greater. There is a considerable expenditure of extra money ($4million) for virtually no change in the conditions or resolution of the project. And this statement can be easily quantified because the variance on the value-added can be written ( which, for the values (J/ = 71.4 2 , and 0 / = 66.02 2 , yields the uncertainty measure on the mean value-added (VA = $ 3.6million) of OVA = $97.24million, reflecting directly the large uncertainties of the EV values as representative measures of the A and B channels. Correspondingly, the volatility of the value-added mean estimate is 0vANA = 27.0 I which is extremely large compared to unity, strongly suggesting that there is no meaning to the $3.6million difference between the A and B branches because the uncertainty is so large on both of the EV values. One can also compute the cumulative probability that one should spend anything at all on acquisition of new data and further studies. The calculation basically uses the same cumulative probability method as given in the previous section; one finds that the probability one should not spend any extra money is 48.5%. And the probability that a value of $3.6million or greater will be brought to the project is only 50%. In short, the expression of mean value-added is not very trustworthy because of its large uncertainty. At one standard error uncertainty the value-added can range from a positive value of $(3.6 + 97.24) million=$IOO.84million, all the way to $(3.6-97.24) million = -$93.64million. This range is so large compared to the mean value of VA that one really has no indication that acquiring a 3-D seismic survey and also doing further studies is either adding to or detracting from the project worth obtaining in the absence of spending the $4million extra for such new information. In short, when uncertainties are allowed for, the acquisition and further studies do not resolve any better the project. They should not be undertaken.
When it is also remembered that there is uncertainty on the project parameters for success probabilities, and also on the potential gains that could accrue (due to both future economic uncertainties on selling price of product and also due to scientific uncertainties in the estimates of probabilities and reserves to be found), and when due allowance is taken of the facts that the improvements in the probability values on the B branch are only what one hopes will be achieved if the 3-D seismic survey and also the further studies are undertaken-and so are subject to even more uncertainty -then it would seem that the so-called improvement of 2.8% in probability of profit is buried in the "noise" caused by the uncertainty of the parameters. The project risk has not been changed substantially. No surveyor further studies should be undertaken; the cost of $4million for both far outweighs the potential improvement estimated to occur, and does little to nothing to lower the risk of the project to any significant degree.
IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The purpose of this paper has been to show that using just the expected value of a project is an extremely dangerous thing to do if one is interested in evaluating the worth of a project and its risk together with the likelihood the project will prove profitable. The quintessential reason is that the EV does not represent one of the possible outcomes of the project and, because one does not have the luxury of undertaking an infinite number of trials (for which the EV would indeed represent the average of all outcomes), then one must include some measure of the uncertainty around the EV. Failure to do so means that one has absolutely no idea how risky a project is nor does one have any idea of its potential for turning a profit. Neither of these factors are included in the expected value, which is not one of the possible outcomes for a single project and so does not represent fairly how a single project should be risked. This point was made using an illustration of two projects with the same EV but very different risk factors, as measured by the standard error of the EV and also by the volatility. In addition, the point was made, with an example from McMahon et al (1999) , that acquiring additional information through a 3-D seismic survey and also further studies, cannot be addressed using only the EV for the value such an endeavor would bring to sharper definition of the project in the absence and presence of the newly acquired information. In particular, the changes in the estimated probabilities of success and failure are only estimates, made prior to the acquisition and further studies. One does not know to what extent the information obtained would really change parameters to the desired values. And, even then, one has to work through not just a difference in estimated EV values in the presence and absence of the new information, but one must, more properly, take into account the uncertainty of the EV values. In this way one correctly estimates volatility and profit probability for the project incorporating some measure of the uncertainty of the EV. Further, there is uncertainty on all parameters entering such project assessments from both future economic concerns of uncertain product selling price and also because of scientific uncertainties on the estimates of reservoir chances, etc., as has been shown in detail elsewhere (Lerche and MacKay, 1999) .
As a consequence of the above arguments taken in toto, it would appear to be less than responsible to use only the expected value to characterize a project when risk and uncertainty need to be included in a logical manner to allow informed decisions to be made on the potential worth and potential losses. The expected value, used on its own, does not permit any such representation, and that has been the point of this paper.
